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A simple, effective approach is presented for 
measuring the susceptibility of power systems to 
cascading blackouts. A failure network and an 
analysis method are proposed, based on line outage 
distribution factors and network theory. This network 
is analyzed with metrics that quantify stress. The 
metrics can be computed rapidly and be used in real-
time operations as well as for. The studies presented 
are remarkable for use of real, large-scale data for 
the entire Western Interconnection of North America. 
The metrics vary reasonably with different seasonal 
and loading conditions. Metrics for a pre-blackout 
reconstruction show that the system was highly 
stressed and correctly identified the most vulnerable 
and critical areas and branches. Lowering stress is a 
serious candidate for reducing risk of cascading. 
 
1. Introduction  
 
Cascading blackouts are the oldest major unsolved 
technical problem in power system engineering, since 
before a famous 1965 event. Two generations of 
engineers have struggled with this puzzling and 
vexing problem. Undamaged systems fail, but not 
from external causes. Cause-and-effect cascades 
affect large areas and are difficult to recover from.  
The power system is a force-at-a-distance, human-
machine energy conversion system of three elements: 
(1) hardware to generate and transmit current, (2) 
control and protection equipment, and (3) practices 
and procedures. 
The second and third elements are too complex to 
be error-proof. They must be designed and operated 
with care, but perfect performance is not practical. 
This paper considers the problem of cascading, 
where one failure causes others in a chain, in an 
essentially undamaged bulk power system. History 
reveals that cascading blackouts occur when failures 
arise in the second or third elements in the above list, 
when large systems are stressed. 
Simple, effective metrics based on network and 
power system theory measure stress, the 
susceptibility of a system to cascading failures. A 
new network, based on known engineering 
principles, models how failures flow through a 
system. In contrast, traditional networks model how 
power flows through a system. We show that 
modelling or simulating all of the phenomena of 
cascading blackouts is not required. 
The stress metrics are computed for very large 
(WI, the Western Interconnection of North America) 
and large (SW WI, southwestern WI) systems in 
different conditions. The results match ad hoc stress 
reasonability judgments. Metrics for a pre-blackout 
state show that the overall stress was very high, 
particularly in cascading areas. 
 
2. Background  
 
A cascading blackout is an uncontrolled, 
unexpected chain of cause-and-effect failures in 
hardware for generating and carrying current. It 
interrupts bulk power service over a large area. 
Cascading blackouts are of concern because it can 
take hours or days to restore the system.  Meanwhile, 
many functions of society are disrupted, sometimes 
with economic losses of billions of US dollars. 
 
2.1. Typical cascading blackouts 
 
The 9 November 1965 Northeast blackout 
occurred with relatively heavy flows on five 
essentially-parallel 230-kV lines from the Niagara 
Falls area to Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Unbeknownst 
to the operators, backup relays were set far below the 
lines’ true ratings, procedural failures. A relay tripped 
one line. Flows on the others increased. They tripped, 
one by one, separating most of the Ontario system 
from New York. Ontario had too much load and New 
York and nearby systems had too much generation. 
Neither could absorb the sudden imbalances. Both 





broke up into islands and blacked out [1]. 
The 14 August 2003 blackout cost the US from 
US$4 billion to US$10 billion. Canada’s GDP was 
reduced. Procedural and computer failures in two 
control centers led to it. Three 345-kV lines failed 
between 15:05 and 15:46 EDT. Not overloaded, they 
sagged into trees that were taller than they should 
have been. The post-mortem concluded that at “15:05 
EDT ... the system was electrically secure [2].” This 
apparently was based on n-1 analyses with key line 
ratings that were much too high, a procedural failure. 
Expecting perfection in practices and procedures is 
neither useful nor an acceptable excuse. The system 
has to survive inevitable errors. 
In 41 minutes, at 15:46, “the blackout might have 
been averted [but] it may already have been too late 
[2].” The final straw, tripping a fourth 345-kV line at 
16:06, was due to a relay interpreting high current 
and low voltage as a short circuit.  
At 3:00 a.m. on Sunday 28 September 2003 (off-
peak time, day, and month), Italy was importing 300 
MW more than its scheduled imports from France, 
mainly via Switzerland, charging its pumped hydro 
plants. A 380-kV Swiss line heated, sagged into a 
tree, flashed, and stayed open. The Swiss asked the 
Italians to reduce imports by 300 MW to meet the 
schedule, which assumed all lines were in service. 
They could have asked, but did not ask the Italians to 
stop pumping. Another line tripped at 3:25 a.m. In 
seconds all lines into Italy tripped, and in three 
minutes all mainland Italy was blacked out [3] [4]. 
 
2.2. Cascading blackouts that did not occur 
 
On 11 April 1965, 37 “Palm Sunday” tornados in 
and near Ohio took 27 American Electric Power Co. 
transmission lines and two extra-high voltage (EHV) 
substations out of service. Customers on failed radial 
lines lost power, but no cascading was reported [5]. It 
was Sunday in an off-peak month. The system was 
lightly loaded—unstressed by any definition. (It was 
not designed to survive 29 contingencies.)   
Other large-system, non-blackout events have 
been discovered. Smaller systems seem not to 
cascade [6], e.g., the Texas system advised one 
author that it has been in extremis several times 
without cascading [7] [8]. 
 
2.3. Other large-scale blackouts: resilience 
 
Puerto Rico was blacked out due to hurricanes 
Irma (service lost by two-thirds of electric customers) 
and Maria (the electrical infrastructure totally 
destroyed) in September 2017. In the January 1998 
Quebec - New York ice storm, every overhead line 
(transmission and distribution) in a large area was on 
the ground. There was a blackout, but no cascading.   
Significant work is being done on a problem 
complementary to ours, blackouts due to major 
disasters, in part developing the notion of resilience 
[9] [10]. There are three key differences between 
such events and the cascading failures of this paper.  
(1) These major disasters do not always result in 
cascading.  The 1965 Palm Sunday tornadoes and the 
1998 ice storm [11] caused great destruction but no 
cascading. (2) They cause extensive physical damage 
to the system, especially to the distribution system, 
which can take weeks or months to repair. Cascading 
failures mostly involve the bulk system, with little or 
no physical damage. (3) Causes of non-cascading 
blackouts include disasters (hurricanes, earthquakes 
[9] [10], cyber-attacks [12]), while cascading events 
are due to internal failures.  The two problems have 
different causes, effects, and solutions.  
For both of these problems, traditional reliability 
does not go far enough. They also have in common 
the definition and application of metrics. These 
metrics evaluate resilience (to extreme external 
events) or stress (for cascading). The two sets of 
metrics and their application are very different [9].  
 
2.4. Cascading failures: previous work 
 
The U.S.-Canadian power industry created NERC 
(now the North American Electric Reliability Corp.) 
after the 1965 blackout to improve reliability. Its 
planning and operating criteria have evolved in detail 
while being stable in basic concepts. NERC “n-1” 
and other standards generally assume that control and 
protective devices, and policies and procedures, will 
work properly, with limited exceptions. Preventing 
cascading always has been central [13].  
State estimation was introduced to provide 
accurate inputs to real-time procedures for increasing 
reliability [14]. 
A NERC study found that 73.5 percent of 
significant events were aggravated by “hidden 
failures” of the protection system, part of the second 
power system element above [15], [16].  
Years ago it was observed that “Power systems 
have grown enormously and have become 
interconnected over vast regions. And we have had 
two severe blackouts and are undoubtedly headed for 
more.” Also, “The more complex a society, the more 
chance there is that it will get fouled up [17].” 
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About one-sixth of an excellent 1978 paper on the 
future power system was on blackouts.  It concluded, 
“[Cascading] blackouts will not exist in the year 2000 
... There is a good chance that by the year 2000 the 
term [cascading blackout] will be considered to be a 
term out of the Dark Ages (sic) [18].”   
Much labor has been invested on the cascading 
problem [19]. But misconceptions can lead to 
questionable conclusions.  For example, “Since 
power systems are generally operated to be N-1 
secure, most historical cascades have been triggered 
by multiple [independent] outages in combination, 
motivating the need for probabilistic analysis [19].”  
Multiple independent outages have caused few, if 
any, cascades, so this conclusion is unsupported. In 
all cascading blackouts known to the authors, system 
operation clearly was not NERC compliant (though 
operators might have thought that it was): a single 
outage caused cascading, a criteria violation.  
 
2.5. N-1 criteria are not sufficient 
 
The post-mortem report of the 14 August 2003 
US/Canada blackout concluded, “Although 
FirstEnergy’s system was technically [i.e., by n-1 
standards] in secure electrical condition before 15:05 
EDT, it was still highly vulnerable [2].”  (Italics 
added by authors) 
This is authoritative recognition that current 
standards are not sufficient for preventing cascading.  
A recent paper called the 1965 Northeast blackout 
an n-5 event, and systems cannot be designed to 
withstand these. The implication: occasional 
blackouts are inevitable [1]. With respect, the authors 
believe that the 1965 outage was not an n-5 event. 
The tripping of the first line (n-1) caused the other 
four to trip in sequence (n-1-1-etc.). The distinction is 
important. Such events are not inevitable. 
 
3. A cascading outage network  
 
3.1. Power flow network 
 
Fig. 1 is the basic model of a network. The one-
line (positive sequence) network is the basis for most 
power system modeling of the bulk transmission 
network. This model uses the Ybus (bus admittance) 





            Fig. 1. Network  
             nomenclature [20] 
The Ybus network has the following properties: 
• Ybus is square and symmetric.  
• Each row and column is for a bus (vertex). 
• Each edge is a branch (line or transformer). 
The off-diagonal terms are branch admittances 
between two buses. Most are zero, since each bus is 
connected to few others. So Ybus is very sparse. The 
laws of Ohm and Kirchhoff determine how demand 
and generation affect bus voltages and branch flows.  
 
3.2. Cascading failure network 
 
The cascading outage problem needs a different 
model since the objective is to find how the outage of 
one branch affects the flows on other branches. In the 
cascading network, the vertices are branches (lines, 
transformers, interfaces), not buses. Each branch is 
linked to every other branch, not by single lines, but 
by the network as a whole. Edges in a cascading 
network are modeled by Line Outage Distribution 
Factors (LODF) or simply Distribution Factors 
(DFAX), defined by: 
 
𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘𝑗 =  𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘0 + (𝐷𝐹𝐴𝑋𝑘𝑗  ×  𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗0). (1) 
 
In (1), 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘0 and  𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘𝑗  are the pre- and post-
outage flows in monitored branch (k), and 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑗0 is 
the pre-outage flow in outaged branch (j). The post-
outage flow in branch (j) is zero, and -1 < DFAXkj < 
+1. 
• DFAX, containing the elements DFAXk,j, 
with mo rows and mm columns, is much larger 
than YBUS. The subscripts “o” and “m” refer 
to “outaged” and “monitored”. 
• Each row is for an n-1 outage branch. 
• Each column is for a branch whose flow is 
monitored (computed) for each n-1outage. 
Commercial power-flow programs compute the 
elements of DFAX from Ybus using the laws of 
Ohm and Kirchhoff.  Branch limits are based on such 
effects as tree heights in rights-of-way. Two 
electrically identical lines in different rights-of-way 
may experience the same n-1 flow after a 
contingency. One may overload but the other not, due 
to different limits. Therefore, failure propagation 
through the DFAX network is complicated in a 
different way than is power flow.   
 
3.3. Typical DFAX matrices 
 
Fig. 2 shows the distributions of the absolute 



















Absolute value of DFAX
2016 Summer high demand
2012 Summer high demand
2011 Sept. 8 Pre-blackout
4,533 DFAX ≥ 0.7 
(2016 Summer high)
3,493 DFAX ≥ 0.7 
(2011 Sept. 8)
(SW WI) for three years: 2016 and 2012 (summer 
high demand), and 8 Sept. 2011 Pre-blackout. Other 
systems have similar curves [6]. Plotted on log-log 
scale, each density function (not shown) is close to a 
straight line, a power law, common in large networks.   
In Fig. 2, each point x,y on a curve is the number 
‘y’ of DFAX whose absolute value is greater than or 
equal to the number ‘x’. (Neither this figure, nor this 
paper, expresses or deals with probabilities.) 
Even in a five-year interval with relatively low 
demand growth, the system evolved to have 30% 
more higher-value DFAX (> 0.7). It became more 
















Fig. 2.  DFAX distributions for SW WI. 
 
4. Stress metrics  
 
4.1. Previous applications of network theory 
 
Euler’s 1736 solution of the Konigsberg bridge 
problem is considered the beginning of network or 
graph theory, but most of its development has 
occurred in the past 100 years.  
For our purposes, network theory responds to three 
observations. 
• Large networks are pervasive. 
• They are too big to study element by element. 
• “Big is different.” “Large” (not precisely 
defined) networks behave differently than 
small networks.  
“The problem with systems like the power grid is 
that they are built of many components whose 
individual behavior is ... well understood ... but 
whose collective behavior ... can be sometimes 
orderly and sometimes chaotic, confusing, and even 
destructive [21].”   
Therefore, concludes network theory, for large 
networks one must study structural properties and 
metrics. References [21] and [20] survey network 
theory and give many examples.  
Network theory has been applied to a variety of 
problems in power, including attempting to determine 
contributions of each generator to each load [22] and 
generating random networks for studying widespread 
failures [23].  
Network theory applications to cascading 
blackouts always use models where buses are vertices 
and lines are edges [24], [25], [26], [27], [28]. They 
consider a random failure at one bus propagating to a 
neighboring bus. They usually are based on abstract 
networks rather than real power systems. They do not 
seem to use Ohm’s and Kirchhoff’s laws to model the 
mechanisms for failure propagation.  
A number of researchers have done work that 
resonates strongly with the approach of this paper. 
Three notable papers are mentioned here. The first 
[15] argues persuasively that the cascading problem 
is neither well formulated nor well addressed. The 
“present practice in system planning and on-line 
security analysis neglects the impact of the protection 
system.” Furthermore, relying on n-1 criteria is 
inadequate, and the “probability of cascading failures 
is much higher than the probability of random (i.e. 
independent) tripping of k out of N components of 
the system.” 
A second study [16] identifies and simulates 
problems which affect cascading: network loading, 
spinning reserve, controls, and “hidden failures” 
(limited to the protection system). Hidden failures are 
not manifested until the system is stressed. Failure 
dynamics are modelled probabilistically.  
Probabilities increase from Pr = 0 below a threshold 
loading (for instance, 100 percent of rating) to Pr = 1 
above a second threshold (say, 140 percent of rating). 
An EPRI project  [29] analyzed n-k conditions on a 
3-area part of the 50,000-bus and 65,000-branch 
Eastern Interconnection of North America. Analyzing 
all n-k conditions was impossible. A few (>31,000) 
independent n-2 outage combinations were created 
and tested from a user-supplied list of perhaps 250 
single contingencies. Most n-2 events ended 
uneventfully after overloaded elements tripped. Some 
38 led to voltage collapse or islanding, but none took 
more than three steps to do so. Particularly intriguing 
are the small number of n-2 outages that resulted in 
overloads, and the huge fraction of these overloads 
that did not lead to further cascading.  
Next we introduce two key concepts as bases of 
this paper: when the system is stressed, it is more 
susceptible to cascading from one of many 
improbable failures, most of which lack models or 
data. Therefore, our focus is on modeling and 




RankV DegreeV* vertex 1 3
0.49 0 1 0 0.49
1.39 2 2 -1.39 0.87
2.43 1 3 -2.43 0
*  Thresholds = 75% of monitored vertex ratings 
Criticality  (outaged vertices "j")
Vulnerability  
(monitored vertices "k")
n-1 flows (fractions 
of monitored 
vertex ratings)
4.2 Vulnerability metrics  
 
Vulnerability is assessed from the n-1 flow in a 
branch after the outage of other branches in the 
system. This is a reasonable measure of stress, as 
cascading always begins with one outage causing one 
or more branches to become highly loaded and fail.  
Vulnerability rank is the maximum absolute value 
of n-1 flow through a branch. RankV is an mm x 1 
column vector. RankVk is the maximum post-outage 
flow on monitored branch (k) for the outage of all mj 
outage branches, taken one at a time. RankVk may be 
greater than, less than, or equal to the pre-
contingency flow on branch (k).  See (1) and (2).  
 
𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑉𝑘 = max (
|𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘,𝑗|
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘
)  𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑠 (𝑗) (2) 
 
Vulnerability degree is the number of outages for 
which a monitored vertex will be heavily loaded. 
This definition differs slightly from the common 
usage of degree. In our examples “heavily loaded” 
means a threshold of 75 percent or 100 percent of 
rating. Specific thresholds will be discussed later. 
DegreeV is an mm x 1 vector. DegreeVk is the 
number of outages for which the absolute value of the 
n-1 power flow on vertex (k) equals or exceeds its 
threshold. See (3), (4).  
 
𝐷𝑒𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑉𝑘 =  ∑ 𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑉𝑘,𝑗
𝑚𝑜
𝑗=1
  𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 (3) 
 
𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑅𝑎𝑛𝑘𝑉𝑘,𝑗 =  0 if (
|𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑘,𝑗|
𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑘
< 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑒𝑠ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑗),  
 else = 1. 
(4) 
 
4.3. Criticality metrics  
 
The criticality of a vertex assesses the seriousness 
of post-outage (n-1) flows in the system following its 
outage.  
Criticality rank, RankC, is a 1 x mo row vector. 
RankCj is the maximum n-1 flow, as a fraction of 
monitored branch rating, over all monitored vertices 
after the outage of vertex (j) (5). 
 




𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠 (𝑘). 
(5) 
 
Criticality degree, DegreeC, is a 1 x mo row 
vector. DegreeCj is the number of monitored vertices 
(k) whose flows will equal or exceed their thresholds 
after the outage of vertex (j) (6), (4).  






4.4. Clarifications and illustration 
 
A mnemonic may be helpful: a vulnerable branch 
is a victim. A critical branch is a culprit.  These 
definitions are for single branches.  For a system, the 
metrics are distributions (which are not probabilities).  
Equations (5) and (6) are very much like (2) and 
(3).  They differ in the subscripts.  See Table I, which 
is useful for understanding this paper. Vulnerability 
analyses are done by rows, criticality by columns.   
The n-1 flows for three monitored vertices 
(branches), the heart of the table, are show in yellow, 
for two outaged vertices that are part of a larger 
system. Branch 2 is a path or interface of 
series/parallel branches, monitored but not outaged.  
Vulnerability Computation (RankV, DegreeV, tan 
area):  RankV2 = max n-1 flow on branch2 = |-1.39| 
of the rating of branch2.  The max is for the outage of 
branch1.  DegreeV2 = 2 because the outage of either 
of two vertices (1 or 3) would cause |flow2| to exceed 
the chosen threshold of 75% of the rating of branch2. 
 
TABLE I 













Criticality computation (RankC, DegreeC, blue 
area):  RankC1 = maximum n-1 flow of any branch 
for the outage of vertex1 = |-2.43|.  DegreeC1 = 2 as 
two monitored vertices have |n-1 flow| > 0.75 for the 
outage of vertex1. 
Interpreting Table I:  RankC and DegreeC agree - 
vertex1 is more critical than vertex3. RankV and 
DegreeV agree - Vertex1 is the least vulnerable. 
 
5. Diagnosing stress using metrics  
 
The system analyzed below evolves constantly as 
facilities are added and upgraded.  Operating states 
change from constantly. Results from past data may 
not reflect the state of the system at any other time.  
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5.1. Western Interconnection study 
 
Analyses of stress for the eastern US and Peru 
have been presented [30] [6] [31]. Here, we report in-
depth studies of North America’s Western 
Interconnection (WI) expanding on the preliminary 
results of [32]. 
The study of the WI used high quality power flow 
base cases (see Table II). All were built by WI 
utilities and WECC and are realistic and consistent. 
Base case access is limited. Data and results are 
tightly controlled under CEII (Critical Energy 
Industry Infrastructure) or similar rules. It is unheard 
of to give researchers access to pre-blackout cases.   
 
TABLE II 
Western Interconnection cases studied 
(Statistics below are for the Southwestern region only) 
 







2016 Summer High  (HS) 62,691  /  57,578 2,419 
2016 Spring High  (HSP) 44,229  /  40,472 2,456 
2016 Winter High (HW) 38,931  /  36,085 2,474 
2016 Winter Low  (LW) 27,530  /  30,500 2,462 
2016 Summer Low  (LS) 34,577  /  32,010 2,401 
2012 Summer High 61,933  /  57,841 2,215 
8 Sept. 2011 Pre-blackout 51,619  /  46,752 2,088 
 
Most analyses below consider only vertices (lines, 
transformers) in SW WI, but the DFAX reflected the 
entire WI. Normal system changes caused minor 
variations in the number of branches. 
 
5.2. Stress metrics and operating states 
 
Stress metrics for individual branches are scalars.  
Stress metrics for systems are distributions of branch 
metrics. As mentioned earlier, distributions should 
not be confused with probabilities. Fig. 3 shows 
system vulnerability metrics for several cases. Most 
vertices have RankV < 1.0, consistent with the n-1 
criteria.   
Up to 295 vertices (12 percent of the 2,400+ 
vertices) have RankV equal to or greater than the 
branch ratings, mainly in high-stress seasons, High 
Demand Summer and Spring. For three seasons, up 
to 20 vertices have n-1 flows more than twice their 
ratings. These may be NERC n-1 violations.   
One might ask how a base case can violate the n-1 
criteria. The base cases are hypothetical, made for WI 
operations planning studies. They are used to identify 
possible problems and do not include “fixes” for all 
of them. For example, a lower-voltage branch may be 
ignored, based on the assumption that events in the 

















Fig. 3. RankV distributions for SW WI, 2016 base cases. 
 
Modelling and data problems are the bane of the 
transition from theory to practice. Happily, here there 
were few such issues in mostly-excellent data, so 
valid conclusions can be drawn. 
Two other explanations for the high RankVs for 
HSP and HS are more troubling. First, the operators 
may be counted on to respond in real-time to some 
contingencies in high-stress conditions. But failures 
in practices and procedures, including operator 
actions, are common triggers for cascading. The 8 
Sept. 2011 blackout involved precisely such failures. 
Second, these high RankV situations may become the 
next unforeseen blackout. 
Fig. 3 and similar distributions for the other three 
metrics are dramatic but difficult to work with. Table 
III, from vertical cuts through the distributions, is 
easier to handle.  
For the SW WI system, RankV is the number of 
branches with vulnerability rank > 1, that is, with n-1 
flows > 100% of the branch rating.  This amounts to 
259 branches for HS - 10.7% of the branches in the 
system, which is a lot.  For HS, 108 branches will 
have n-1 flows > rating for at least two separate 
contingencies (DegreeV > 2).  
Criticality is a less familiar concept.  In HS, for 
each of 309 single contingencies, at least 1 monitored 
branch will have n-1 flows > threshold (100% of 
rating in this table).  DegreeC > 2 means that for each 
of 89 single contingencies (in HS), n-1 flows on two 
or more monitored lines will exceed threshold.  
Table III also includes an ad hoc judgment on how 
much the system is at risk to cascading. Demand and 
Page 3373
imports/exports (Table II) are considered to be first 
order stressors, and common practice to avoid 
maintenance in peak seasons is considered to be a 
second order stressor. 
For the 2016 data, with two minor exceptions the 
four metrics are consistent with this ad hoc stress 
judgment.  (The 2011 data will be discussed later.) 
Most values of the metrics differ in the first 
significant figure.  The differentiation is quite clear. 
 
TABLE III   














Planners and operators could identify the high 
vulnerability branches and look for ways to reduce it, 
as higher stress means higher risk of cascading.  They 
might focus more on the highly critical branches: 
some outages could cause high n-1 loadings; a few of 
these may affect many branches. Or they could seek 
ways to make their system inherently less stressed.  
 
5.3. Pre-blackout metrics, 8 September 2011 
 
On 8 September 2011, a switching error tripped 
the 500kV Hassayampa - North Gila line. The line 
had tripped before without cascading, but on this day 
all the SW WI metrics showed high stress (Table III). 
The 500kV outage caused the two Coachella 
230kV/92kV transformers to overload and trip. 
Further cascading blacked out much of SW WI [33].  
Metrics show where stress was highest:  7.5% of 
Imperial Irrigation District branches (Table IV, row 
2) had RankV > 1, well above the SW WI average. 
Six, including the Coachella transformers, were 
vulnerable for two or more n-1 outages.  
Cascading began in Arizona (row 1), with over 
one-third of the critical SW WI branches, including 
the initiating outage.  
An area being stressed does not mean that 
cascading will occur or start there. But history is 
clear: cascading occurs when a system is stressed. 
Had the operators known, they could have reduced 
the stress. A switching error need not have cascaded.  
 
TABLE IV   
Pre-cascading metrics, seven SW WI areas and total,  












   Notes: Here “branches” include non-outaged radial lines and transformers. 
              A few branches are counted in more than one area. 
 
5.4. Inflections and Thresholds 
 
Change in demand can affect stress. Dealing with 
this effect takes in-depth knowledge of a system. 
WECC’s 2016 cases embody careful, consistent 
modeling. In Fig. 4, stress goes up linearly with 
demand.  At about 35,000 MW, the slope changes.  
Another interpretation: at 62,700 MW of demand, 
about 600 branches are loaded to or above 75 percent 
of their ratings for n-1 contingencies. Of these 
branches, 260 reach or exceed 100 percent of ratings, 
and 100 reach or exceed 125 percent of ratings. The 
system is highly stressed at this level of demand. 
The pattern is the same for all thresholds. The 
value of the threshold affects the slope, but changes 
only a little the location of the inflection. Tipping 















Fig. 4. Vulnerability rank as a function of demand, SW WI.  
 
Setting thresholds too high or too low may give 
odd results. Choosing a reasonable threshold is like 
focusing a microscope, and is not difficult. 
No claim is made that a branch will fail once flow 
reaches the threshold. Choosing thresholds for 
 
Ar a Branches
 Arizona 1,542          39 2.5% 25 1.6% 73 4.7% 7 0.5%
 Imperial IID 134              10 7.5% 6 4.5% 7 5.2% 1 0.7%
 LADWP 272              0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.4% 1 0.4%
 Mexico-CFE 255              4 1.6% 2 0.8% 4 1.6% 0 0.0%
 Nevada 506              6 1.2% 2 0.4% 14 2.8% 0 0.0%
 San Diego 397              6 1.5% 1 0.3% 11 2.8% 4 1.0%
 SoCal SCE 1,057          62 5.9% 28 2.6% 75 7.1% 15 1.4%
 SW WI 4,096       126 3.1% 63 1.5% 183 4.5% 27 0.7%
Notes: Branches include lines and transformers.
Some branches are included in more than one area.
SW 2011Sept08 w/o PST  5/22/2017: 13:1
Abid - please change > to > in printing headings and in software calculations.  




DEGREEV > 2 RANKC > 1 DEGREEC > 2
(DegreeC > 1)





High - HS 259 10.7% 108 4.5% 309 12.8% 89 3.7% Highest 2,419           
Low - LS 38 1.6% 4 0.2% 41 1.7% 1 0.0% Low 2,401           
Winter 2016
High - HW 51 2.1% 6 0.2% 49 2.0% 5 0.2% Medium 2,474           
Low - LW 26 1.1% 4 0.2% 24 1.0% 2 0.1% Lowest 2,462           
Spring 2016
High - HSP 109 4.4% 34 1.4% 96 3.9% 14 0.6% High 2,456           
128 6.1% 46 2.2% 161 7.7% 32 1.5% Pre-blackout 2,088           




RankV > 1 
(DegreeV > 1)
DegreeV > 2






(DEGREEV> 1) (DEGREEC> 1)
 Alberta 2,022          53 2.6% 26 1.3% 154 7.6% 48 2.4%
 Arizona 1,771          67 3.8% 38 2.1% 105 5.9% 24 1.4%
 BC Hydro 3,042          107 3.5% 61 2.0% 135 4.4% 57 1.9%
 El Paso 386             13 3.4% 5 1.3% 19 4.9% 3 0.8%
 Fortis BC 312             16 5.1% 8 2.6% 20 6.4% 6 1.9%
 Idaho 502             3 0.6% 0 0.0% 14 2.8% 10 2.0%
 Imperial IID 327             8 2.4% 4 1.2% 8 2.4% 2 0.6%
 LADWP 539             29 5.4% 18 3.3% 29 5.4% 10 1.9%
 Mexico-CFE 263             9 3.4% 8 3.0% 28 10.6% 6 2.3%
 Montana 541             3 0.6% 1 0.2% 21 3.9% 9 1.7%
 Nevada 746             16 2.1% 2 0.3% 17 2.3% 0 0.0%
 New Mexico 793             18 2.3% 5 0.6% 17 2.1% 5 0.6%
 Northwest 4,973          122 2.5% 49 1.0% 455 9.1% 339 6.8%
 PACE 1,634          65 4.0% 6 0.4% 72 4.4% 16 1.0%
 PG and E 4,471          149 3.3% 71 1.6% 211 4.7% 58 1.3%
 PS Colorado 832             21 2.5% 8 1.0% 24 2.9% 4 0.5%
 San Diego 504             42 8.3% 18 3.6% 72 14.3% 25 5.0%
 Sierra 608             17 2.8% 2 0.3% 4 0.7% 0 0.0%
 SoCal SCE 1,281          102 8.0% 54 4.2% 98 7.7% 45 3.5%
 WAPA RM 1,127          6 0.5% 0 0.0% 2 0.2% 0 0.0%
 WAPA UM 49                2 4.1% 1 2.0% 2 4.1% 0 0.0%
 All WI 26,447    858 3.2% 381 1.4% 1,490 5.6% 658 2.5%
Notes Branches include lines and transformers.
Some Branches are included in more than one area.
Case WI 16HS3ae; Loss less  DC; w/o PST  5/19/2017: 20:30
RANKV> 1 DEGREEV> 2 RANKC> 1 DEGREEC> 2
Vulnerability Criticality
DegreeV and DegreeC is for making vertical cuts 
through the distributions, to create Tables III – V. 
The results are easier to work with than Fig 3.  
 
5.5. Very large system studies 
 
For Table V, essentially all WI branches were 
outaged and monitored. Key areas (rows) are 
highlighted. In one, for 8% of its branches n-1 
loadings met or exceeded the branch limits. This area 
and two others were the most vulnerable in the WI. 
They also had the highest fraction of branches that 
were overloaded by two or more single 
contingencies.  A fourth high stress area also is noted. 
One area had 455 RankC>1 branches. If any of 
these branches had an outage, other branches would 
overload. For 339 very critical branches, two or more 
other branches would overload. One-third of the 
critical branches in the WI, and one- half of the 
highly critical ones, were in this area.  Another area 
with high DegreeC is also found. An interesting 
conclusion is that stress-related problems can be 
different in nature for different areas. 
 
6. Adequacy and implications of metrics 
 
6.1. Adequacy of stress metrics  
 
Three issues appear to have been overlooked in 
this work. First, cascading often includes non-linear 
effects like voltage collapse or transient instability. 
These usually result from high branch loading. It 
usually is not necessary to model these effects 
separately in computing the metrics.  
In the studies above, the branch and path limits 
were determined from conductor thermal ratings, but 
reduced as needed for special voltage or transient 
stability concerns, etc. For each monitored branch the 
metrics measure how close n-1 flows are to these 
limits, including these adjustments. The method does 
not model all the phenomena associated with 
cascading. But there is a benefit to having a simple 
practical approximate technique if it can provide an 
effective warning signal in a real, large scale system. 
Our metrics can.  
Linear DFAX analysis is an accepted way of 
approximating post-contingency MW flows on all of 
the other branches, for each contingency. But if the 
DFAX do not give accurate enough n-1 flows, a.c. 
contingency analysis, which is not too much slower, 
can be used in calculating metrics.  
The second issue:  cascading is an n-1-k-... event.  
 
TABLE V 
Western Interconnection metrics, Summer High load, 2016. 

























One may ask, “How can the metrics, which come 
from n-1 analyses, measure the risk of cascading?”  
The first and obvious part of the answer is that a 
necessary condition for cascading is that some first 
contingency cause a second contingency.  
The metrics consider all possible first (n-1) 
contingencies. For each of these, the metrics evaluate 
the post-contingency flows on every branch. If all the 
metrics of vulnerability and criticality are low, the 
system is not stressed, and it is unlikely that n-1-1 
cascading will occur. On the other hand, the more 
high indices there are, the more opportunities for an 
n-1-1 event, and for further cascading as well. In 
other words, the metrics for each n-1 state are 
indicative of the system risk beyond that n-1 event. 
High stress is necessary for cascading, we claim. It 
is not a sufficient condition. History reveals that the 
right failure also must occur in control and protection 
devices, or in practices and procedures.  
The stress metrics do not attempt to forecast 
cascading. They quantify the risk of cascading. 
A third issue: Our study did not model remedial 
action schemes (RAS). Most power flow programs 
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could not do it then, but PowerWorld, which we 
used, could. One reviewer noted that WI RAS data 
usually is not given to researchers, and a “forgotten” 
RAS made the 2011 blackout worse. Modeling that 
RAS would not have changed our conclusions. 
 
6.2. Which metric is best? 
 
Each metric measures stress in a different way. 
None has been shown to be “best”. Tests have not 
shown high correlations among them [32]. It is 
reasonable for the stress of a complex system to be 
multi-faceted, a vector, not a scalar. Combining the 
four metrics into a single metric would destroy 
information. 
Medicine also uses a vector of four or five stress 
metrics, called vital signs. Measuring the metrics is 
simple, e.g., a thermometer scan of the forehead. It is 
more useful to know that “All vital signs are normal, 
except that the pulse is quite high” than that “The 
weighted sum of all the vital signs is a bit high.” 
 
6.3. Two implications and a practical issue 
 
As demand and generation grow, transmission 
systems are expanded to increase transfer capability. 
Previous work showed that this expansion may 
increase the risk of cascading [6]. This important 
topic is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Another important topic – how operators and 
planners may appropriately reduce stress – is also 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
For real networks, the database is huge, but most 
DFAXes are very small. In this work, sparsity 
methods were used to store and compute only with 
DFAX absolute values above 0.001. 
 
7. Summary and conclusions 
 
This paper presents significant advances on the 
oldest major unsolved technical problem in power 
systems, cascading blackouts. 
Four metrics quantify stress, the risk of cascading. 
These metrics were computed for the Western 
Interconnection of North America (WI) using utility 
databases for different seasons and demands.  
The same metrics were computed for a 
reconstruction of the pre-event state of a major 
cascading blackout. The metrics showed that the 
system was at high risk. They identified the areas 
where cascading developed, and the key branches 
involved, as being very vulnerable and critical. 
 
Other interesting new results include: 
• In a large system with low load growth, the 
number of large DFAX grew 32% in five 
years. More branches became tightly coupled. 
• Stress varies reasonably and significantly in 
time and location, with differing needs for 
preventive action. 
• Tipping points were observed in this and 
earlier studies using the metrics. 
• 26,400 easy-to-do contingency analyses gave 
useful diagnoses of risk of cascading for all 
the WI, without running 350E+06 n-2 cases. 
We conclude that the metrics are useful and 
practical measures of stress. The input data is a 
power flow base case or a real-time or stored state 
estimation snapshot. Proper use of these metrics will 
identify a system’s susceptibility to cascading, and 
will pinpoint the most vulnerable and critical areas 
and facilities. The information can be used for 
planning, operations, and post-mortems. 
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